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A	COMMENT	ON	COLWELL V. RITE AID
By Frederick J. Melkey1
I.	 Introduction
A. Colwell v. Rite Aid Breaks New Ground
The Americans with Disability Act2
(“ADA”) requires an employer to provide reasonable 
accommodation to an employee or job applicant with 
a disability, unless doing so would cause signifi cant 
diffi culty or expense for the employer.3 The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) 
describes a reasonable accommodation as “any 
change in the work environment (or in the way things are 
usually done) to help a person with a disability apply 
for a job, perform the duties of  a job, or enjoy the 
benefi ts and privileges of  employment.”4 Historically, 
employers have understood that the scope of  a 
“reasonable accommodation” is limited to the 
workplace.5 As one court stated, “[w]hile an employer 
is required to provide reasonable accommodations 
that eliminate barriers in the work environment, an 
employer is not required to eliminate those barriers 
which exist outside the work environment.”6
Last year, the Third Circuit broke with 
historical precedent in the case of  Colwell v. Rite 
Aid Corp.7 It stated that the ADA “does not strictly 
limit the breadth of  reasonable accommodations to 
address only those problems that an employee has 
in performing her work that arise once she arrives 
at the workplace.”8 Colwell was in direct confl ict with 
a Third Circuit unpublished decision by a different 
three judge panel.9 This result led to concern within 
the employer community about judicial expansion of  
the reasonable accommodation requirement under 
the ADA.10 Fueling employer concerns is a new 
unpublished decision in the Ninth Circuit, Livingston 
v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc.11 which favorably cites Colwell, 
and also fi nds that the employer needs to consider 
a reasonable accommodation for the non-workplace 
commute.
Colwell has drawn limited commentary 
from the academic community. Professor Sullivan 
mentions in a blog posting that Colwell may implicate 
the existing EEOC guidance that the ADA does 
not require an employer to make accommodations 
primarily for the employee’s personal benefi t.12 As 
he points out, “getting to work is not exactly for 
personal benefi t, but both cases [Colwell and a 1995 
case which it cites] illustrate the occasional diffi culty 
of  drawing the work/personal line. Certainly, many 
employers view their workers’ commutation as their 
own responsibility.”13
This paper recommends that although much 
of  the case law14 has not interpreted the reasonable 
accommodation provision of  the ADA as broadly as 
Colwell, the holding and reasoning should be adopted 
by other circuits. Both legislative history and public 
policy reasons militate in favor of  this approach. Much 
like the courts chipped away at the ADA’s defi nition 
of  a “person with a disability,” narrowing it to the 
point it required Congress to enact amendments in 
2008 to overturn Supreme Court precedent,15 the 
courts have been similarly limiting the interpretation 
of  “reasonable accommodation.” I promote a return 
to requiring employers and employees to engage in 
the interactive process envisioned by the ADA in 
circumstances similar to those in Colwell. A broader 
reading of  the ADA’s reasonable accommodation 
requirements would not be judicial expansion, but a 
return to both the original meaning of  the Act and the 
intent of  Congress when it enacted the ADA twenty 
years ago. To that end, Colwell is not really breaking 
new ground; it is replacing the divot16 made by courts as 
they have taken repeated swings at the statute.
SPRING 2011 23
B.  A Summary of  the Original and Continuing need 
for the ADA
People with disabilities have endured an 
inferior economic position in American society.17 
Before passage of  the ADA in 1990
[T]wo out of  every three disabled 
Americans of  working-age were not 
employed, and two of  three who 
were not working wanted to be, the 
income of  disabled workers was 
about thirty six percent less than 
that of  their nondisabled counter-
parts, and in 1984 fifty percent of  
adults with disabilities had house-
hold incomes of  $15,000 or less, 
compared to only twenty-five per-
cent of  non-disabled adults.18
Many of  these trends continue to this day. 
In November of  2010, more than two out of  three 
working-age people with disabilities were still not 
employed; those without disabilities were employed at 
roughly twice that rate.19 As the Department of  Labor 
recently articulated in a news release seeking public 
input on ways to strengthen disability regulations
…the rate of  disabled people who 
are unemployed or not in the labor 
force remain[s] significantly higher 
than those without disabilities. 
According to recent data from the 
U.S. Department of  Labor’s Bureau 
of  Labor Statistics, 21.7 percent of  
people with disabilities were in the 
labor force in June 2010, compared 
with 70.5 percent of  people with 
no disability. In addition, the unem-
ployment rate for those with dis-
abilities was 14.4 percent, compared 
with 9.4 percent unemployment for 
those without a disability.
“Work is central to every person’s 
financial independence, sense of  
self  and integrity,” said OFCCP 
Director Patricia A. Shiu.20
This poor experience of  the disabled in the 
workplace can not be explained solely by the types of  
prejudice encountered by racial and ethnic minorities, 
women, and the elderly.21 Many disabilities prevent 
effective performance in a broad variety of  jobs.22 
Moreover, employers may find it efficient to refuse 
to hire anyone with particular disabilities regardless 
of  their ability to do the job because employers have 
structured their work processes and physical facilities 
for the average non-disabled worker.23 “The lowering 
of  this type of  barrier to the equal participation 
of  individuals in the workforce requires regulation 
beyond the mere condemnation of  unequal treatment 
on the basis of  disability as a suspect, protected 
class.”24 Instead, it requires the employers make 
accommodations for the disabled in the workplace. 
How far the employer must go to make reasonable 
accommodations is a policy choice with many facets.25
II.		The	History	of	Workplace	Disability	
Legislation
A.  The Precursor to the ADA: The Rehabilitation 
Act of  1973
In its first significant treatment of  how far 
employers must go to provide accommodation for 
disabled employees, Congress stopped short of  
imposing obligations on private employers that could 
not pass the costs along to the federal government.26 
The Rehabilitation Act of  197327 made the policy 
choice that those accommodation costs be assessed 
upon federal sector employers, federal contractors, 
and other employers receiving federal financial 
assistance.28
“The 1973 Act, in addition to increasing 
funding for vocational rehabilitation, sought to 
eradicate discriminatory and other barriers to the hiring 
of  disabled workers.”29 Part of  the purpose stated in 
the statute is “to ensure that the Federal Government 
plays a leadership role in promoting the employment 
of  individuals with disabilities, especially individuals 
with significant disabilities, and in assisting States and 
providers of  services in fulfilling the aspirations of  
such individuals with disabilities for meaningful and 
gainful employment and independent living.”30
“Section 501 imposes affirmative action 
obligations on federal agencies. Section 502 seeks to 
remove physical barriers in federal buildings. Section 
503 levies affirmative action duties on all federal 
contractors with contracts in excess of  $10,000. These 
duties extend to all of  the contractors’ operations.”31 
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Section 504 prohibits federal programs and any 
program or activity receiving federal funding assistance 
from discriminating against “otherwise qualified 
individual[s] with a disability . . . solely by reason of  
her or his disability.”32 Thus, the Rehabilitation Act 
of  1973 goes beyond the neutral treatment of  people 
with disabilities to require something more to ensure 
opportunities in employment.
B.  ADA: The American’s with Disabilities Act of  1990
“Congress rarely writes on a clean slate, 
and the ADA is no exception to this rule. Congress 
drew heavily on section 504 and its regulations when 
enacting the ADA.”33	Seventeen years after enacting 
the Rehabilitation Act, Congress took the next step 
of  imposing similar obligations on all but the smallest 
private employers by enacting the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.34 Supreme Court Justice Stevens 
noted
The ADA was passed by large 
majorities in both Houses of  Con-
gress after decades of  deliberation 
and investigation into the need 
for comprehensive legislation to 
address discrimination against per-
sons with disabilities. In the years 
immediately preceding the ADA’s 
enactment, Congress held 13 hear-
ings and created a special task force 
that gathered evidence from every 
State in the Union. The conclusions 
Congress drew from this evidence 
are set forth in the task force and 
Committee Reports, described in 
lengthy legislative hearings, and 
summarized in the preamble to 
the statute. Central among these 
conclusions was Congress’ finding 
that “individuals with disabilities 
are a discrete and insular minority 
who have been faced with restric-
tions and limitations, subjected to 
a history of  purposeful unequal 
treatment, and relegated to a posi-
tion of  political powerlessness in 
our society, based on characteris-
tics that are beyond the control of  
such individuals and resulting from 
stereotypic assumptions not truly 
indicative of  the individual ability 
of  such individuals to participate in, 
and contribute to, society.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101(a)(7).
Invoking “the sweep of  congressio-
nal authority, including the power to 
enforce the fourteenth amendment 
and to regulate commerce,” the 
ADA is designed “to provide a clear 
and comprehensive national man-
date for the elimination of  discrimi-
nation against individuals with dis-
abilities.” §§ 12101(b)(1), (b)(4). It 
forbids discrimination against per-
sons with disabilities in three major 
areas of  public life: employment, 
which is covered by Title I of  the 
statute; public services, programs, 
and activities, which are the subject 
of  Title II; and public accommo-
dations, which are covered by Title 
III.35
Also key within the employment context is 
that the ADA defines a “qualified individual with a 
disability” to mean “an individual with a disability 
who, with or without a reasonable accommodation can 
perform the essential functions of  the employment 
position that such individual holds or desires.”36 It 
also expressly includes as a category of  discrimination 
“not making reasonable accommodations to the known 
physical or mental limitations of  an otherwise 
qualified individual with a disability who is an 
applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can 
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose 
an undue hardship on the operation of  the business 
of  such covered entity.”37 As such, the ADA “clearly 
seems to require employers something more than 
formally neutral treatment.”38
C.  ADAAA: The ADA Amendments Act of  2008
The ADA Amendments Act of  200839 
(ADAAA) is the most recent legislative response to 
the issues people with disabilities face. The ADAAA 
“represents a fairly dramatic change in disability 
law.”40 As Professor Long observes, many of  the 
objectives of  the ADA were never realized
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When the first President Bush signed 
the original Americans with Disabil-
ities Act (ADA) into law in 1990, he 
said it was time “to rejoice in and 
celebrate another ‘Independence 
Day,’ one that is long overdue.” For 
the 43 million Americans with dis-
abilities, the ADA was supposed to 
represent the opening of  doors that 
had long been closed. Employers, 
state and local governments, and 
private businesses—from bowling 
alleys to restaurants—would now be 
required to make reasonable modi-
fications to their facilities, policies, 
and procedures in order to allow full 
participation by individuals with dis-
abilities. In short, expectations for 
the ADA were high.
This probably explains why the 
ADA is viewed so widely by disabil-
ity rights advocates and its original 
authors as such a huge disappoint-
ment, especially in the employment 
context. Studies consistently reveal 
that, despite the ADA, employees 
who claim to be the victims of  dis-
ability discrimination in the work-
place face long odds. . . .
The ADA Amendments Act of  2008 sets 
out to address some of  the more controversial and 
problematic aspects of  the definition of  disability 41
The ADAAA is a legislative response to 
years of  judicial narrowing of  that definition as it 
specifically abrogates several Supreme Court rulings.42 
The statute indicates that the purpose is to “carry 
out the ADA’s objectives of  providing ‘a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination 
of  discrimination’ and ‘clear, strong, consistent, 
enforceable standards addressing discrimination’ 
by reinstating a broad scope of  protection to be 
available under the ADA”43 This expanded definition 
of  disability means that more people will be able to 
pass the initial coverage threshold, and be able to 
enter the interactive process in which an employer 
must consider reasonable accommodations.44
One issue that has recently divided the 
circuit courts is whether an employer must provide 
a reasonable accommodation to an individual that it 
merely “regards as” having a disability.45 “The Act 
provides that employers and other covered entities 
‘need not provide a reasonable accommodation or 
a reasonable modification to policies, practices, or 
procedures to an individual who meets’ the ‘regarded 
as’ definition. Thus, the new amendments effectively 
end the ongoing dispute among the courts on this 
issue.” 46 Congress did not address other aspects of  
reasonable accommodations.
III.	Defining	a	“Reasonable”	Accommodation
A.  Statutory Overview
Since Colwell is in the employment context, 
this paper focuses on the meaning of  a Reasonable 
Accommodation within Title I of  the ADA.47 
“One of  the most elusive concepts in the ADA is 
that of  ‘reasonable accommodation’ in the context 
of  employment.”48 There are several sections and 
definitions of  terms that must be read together to 
establish the standard for providing a reasonable 
accommodation.
To avoid discriminating against a qualified 
person with a disability, the text of  the statute requires 
that the employer “mak[e] reasonable accommodations 
to the known physical or mental limitations of  an 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is 
an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity 
can demonstrate that the accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship on the operation of  the 
business of  such covered entity.”49 The definitions 
section provides some clues to the meaning of  this 
passage. First, it defines a “qualified individual” 
as “an individual who, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of  
the employment position that such individual holds 
or desires.”50 However, the very next sentence of  
the statute provides a surprise. “The ADA does not 
define ‘reasonable accommodation.’ Instead, it lists 
examples of  what the term may include.”51
The term “reasonable accommoda-
tion” may include—
(A) making existing facilities used by 
employees readily accessible to and 
usable by individuals with disabili-
ties; and
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(B) job restructuring, part-time 
or modified work schedules, reassign-
ment to a vacant position, acquisi-
tion or modification of  equipment 
or devices, appropriate adjustment 
or modifications of  examina-
tions, training materials or policies, 
the provision of  qualified readers 
or interpreters, and other similar 
accommodations for individuals 
with disabilities.52
While the accommodations in sub-paragraph 
A require physical changes to the workplace, those 
in sub-paragraph B are mandatory departures from 
neutral employer practices.53 As Professor Weber 
observes
In the text of  the ADA, Con-
gress buttressed its requirement 
that employers depart from oth-
erwise neutral rules by prohibiting 
standards, criteria, or methods of  
administration that have the effect 
of  discriminating on the basis of  
disability, as well as by outlawing 
qualification standards, employment 
tests, or other selection criteria that 
tend to screen out persons with dis-
abilities unless the standard, test, or 
other criterion is shown to be job-
related and consistent with business 
necessity. So not only may a variance 
or departure from an otherwise neu-
tral rule or practice be required as a 
matter of  reasonable accommoda-
tion, but also the neutral rule itself  
may be illegal when applied to an 
applicant or employee with a disabil-
ity if  it has a discriminatory effect or 
unjustified negative impact.54
Another key part of  understanding the duty to 
provide a reasonable accommodation is the limitation 
is that it must fall below the threshold of  an undue 
hardship. “Unlike reasonable accommodation, ‘undue 
hardship’ receives a statutory definition.”55 It includes 
not only a definition, but also a detailed list of  factors 
to consider when making the determination.
The term “undue hardship” means 
an action requiring significant dif-
ficulty or expense, when considered 
in light of  the factors set forth in 
subparagraph (B).
(B) Factors to be considered
In determining whether an accom-
modation would impose an undue 
hardship on a covered entity, factors 
to be considered include—
(i) the nature and cost of  the accom-
modation needed under this chapter;
(ii) the overall financial resources 
of  the facility or facilities involved 
in the provision of  the reason-
able accommodation; the num-
ber of  persons employed at such 
facility; the effect on expenses and 
resources, or the impact otherwise 
of  such accommodation upon the 
operation of  the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources 
of  the covered entity; the overall 
size of  the business of  a covered 
entity with respect to the number of  
its employees; the number, type, and 
location of  its facilities; and
(iv) the type of  operation or opera-
tions of  the covered entity, includ-
ing the composition, structure, and 
functions of  the workforce of  such 
entity; the geographic separateness, 
administrative, or fiscal relationship 
of  the facility or facilities in ques-
tion to the covered entity.56
Reading these portions of  the statute together, 
“[t]he text and structure of  the statute suggest a 
substantial obligation to provide accommodation 
up to the limit of  hardship demonstrated by the 
employer.”57
B.  EEOC Interpretation
Under the familiar Chevron doctrine, courts 
must grant deference to the EEOC’s interpretation 
of  the ADA where it is reasonable.58 “With regard to 
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reasonable accommodation and undue hardship, the 
EEOC regulations for Title I of  the ADA repeat the 
prohibition in the statute, stating that it is unlawful 
for covered entities to fail to make reasonable 
accommodations unless they can demonstrate that 
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship 
on the business operations of  the employer.”59 
Without providing a more detailed definition or 
factors to consider, “[l]ike the statute, the regulations 
rely more on example or typology than definition 
when discussing reasonable accommodation.”60 The 
EEOC regulations state that
[t]he term reasonable accommoda-
tions means: (i) [m]odifications or 
adjustments to a job application 
process that enable a qualified appli-
cant with a disability to be consid-
ered for the position such qualified 
applicant desires; or (ii) [m]odifica-
tions or adjustments to the work 
environment, or the manner or cir-
cumstances under which the posi-
tion held or desired is customarily 
performed, that enable a qualified 
individual with a disability to per-
form the essential functions of  that 
position; or (iii) [m]odifications or 
adjustments that enable a covered 
entity’s employee with a disability to 
enjoy equal benefits and privileges 
of  employment as are enjoyed by its 
other similarly situated employees 
without disabilities.
The regulations save their defini-
tional language for undue hardship, 
and essentially track the statute 
when they provide the definition. 
The regulations specifically list dif-
ficulties imposed on co-workers, 
not as part of  what may make an 
accommodation unreasonable, but 
as part of  what may make hardship 
undue for the employer.61
The EEOC Interpretative Guidance does 
go a bit deeper and provides additional examples and 
categories of  possible accommodations.
There are a number of  possible 
reasonable accommodations that 
an employer may have to provide 
in connection with modifications 
to the work environment or adjust-
ments in how and when a job is per-
formed. These include:
• making existing facilities accessible;
• job restructuring;
• part-time or modified work schedules;
•  acquiring or modifying equip-
ment;
•  changing tests, training materials, 
or policies;
• providing qualified readers or 
interpreters; and
•  reassignment to a vacant position.62
The Interpretive Guidance goes further in 
describing the requirements related to modifying 
work schedules as a reasonable accommodation in 
question and answer format with three examples of  
how it applies.
Must an employer allow an employee 
with a disability to work a modified 
or part-time schedule as a reason-
able accommodation, absent undue 
hardship?
Yes. A modified schedule may 
involve adjusting arrival or departure 
times, providing periodic breaks, 
altering when certain functions are 
performed, allowing an employee 
to use accrued paid leave, or pro-
viding additional unpaid leave. An 
employer must provide a modified 
or part-time schedule when required 
as a reasonable accommodation, 
absent undue hardship, even if  it 
does not provide such schedules for 
other employees.
Example A: An employee with HIV 
infection must take medication 
on a strict schedule. The medica-
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tion causes extreme nausea about 
one hour after ingestion, and gen-
erally lasts about 45 minutes. The 
employee asks that he be allowed to 
take a daily 45-minute break when 
the nausea occurs. The employer 
must grant this request absent 
undue hardship.
For certain positions, the time dur-
ing which an essential function is 
performed may be critical. This 
could affect whether an employer 
can grant a request to modify an 
employee’s schedule. Employers 
should carefully assess whether 
modifying the hours could signifi-
cantly disrupt their operations — 
that is, cause undue hardship — or 
whether the essential functions may 
be performed at different times with 
little or no impact on the operations 
or the ability of  other employees to 
perform their jobs.
If  modifying an employee’s sched-
ule poses an undue hardship, an 
employer must consider reassign-
ment to a vacant position that would 
enable the employee to work during 
the hours requested.
Example B: A day care worker 
requests that she be allowed to 
change her hours from 7:00 a.m.–
3:00 p.m. to 10:00 a.m.–6:00 p.m. 
because of  her disability. The day 
care center is open from 7:00 a.m.–
7:00 p.m. and it will still have suf-
ficient coverage at the beginning of  
the morning if  it grants the change 
in hours. In this situation, the 
employer must provide the reason-
able accommodation.
Example C: An employee works 
for a morning newspaper, operat-
ing the printing presses which run 
between 10 p.m. and 3 a.m. Due to 
her disability, she needs to work in 
the daytime. The essential function 
of  her position, operating the print-
ing presses, requires that she work 
at night because the newspaper can-
not be printed during the daytime 
hours. Since the employer cannot 
modify her hours, it must consider 
whether it can reassign her to a dif-
ferent position.63
“The Supreme Court views EEOC 
interpretations of  this type as less than controlling 
authority but notes that they ‘constitute a body of  
experience and informed judgment to which courts 
and litigants may properly resort for guidance.’”64 
However, they do establish the guideposts for how 
the administrative agency responsible for enforcing 
the ADA views an employer’s responsibility in making 
adjustments to work schedules, and the types of  cases 
the EEOC might choose to pursue.
C.  The Supreme Court Standard from U.S. Airways, 
Inc v. Barnett
Although many aspects of  ADA have come 
before the Supreme Court,65 only one case addresses 
the reasonable accommodation requirement of  the 
act, U.S. Airways, Inc v. Barnett.66 “Robert Barnett 
injured his back while working as a cargo handler for 
U.S. Airways and transferred to a mailroom position 
that was less physically demanding. Two years later, 
Barnett’s position became open for seniority-based 
employee bidding, and Barnett learned that employees 
senior to him planned to bid for it.”67 At this point, 
he became “[c]oncerned that he would be forced to 
transfer back to his cargo position.”68 “Barnett asked 
U.S. Airways to accommodate his disability under the 
ADA by granting him an exemption from seniority 
rules so that he could remain in the mailroom. 
U.S. Airways denied Barnett’s request, and shortly 
thereafter Barnett lost his job.”69
The Ninth Circuit initially affirmed 
the district court’s grant of  sum-
mary judgment for U.S. Airways, 
but upon rehearing en banc, the 
full panel reversed and remanded. 
Rejecting the notion that a senior-
ity system always trumps reasonable 
accommodation considerations, the 
panel held that the presence of  a 
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seniority system is merely “a factor 
in the undue hardship analysis.” The 
panel demanded that courts under-
take a “case-by-case fact inten-
sive analysis” to ascertain whether 
the requested reassignment would 
impose an undue hardship on the 
employer. Reviewing the record, 
the court concluded that a trial was 
needed to resolve the factual dispute 
in Barnett’s case. 70
The Supreme Court decided in a 5-4 decision 
to vacate the Ninth Circuits en banc ruling and 
remanded.71
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer 
rejected both parties’ “radically dif-
ferent” views and adopted a compro-
mise position. He began his analysis 
by criticizing U.S. Airways’ interpre-
tation of  the ADA as requiring only 
“equal” (as opposed to preferen-
tial) treatment of  disabled workers. 
On the contrary, the ADA’s focus 
on “accommodation” implies the 
need for differential treatment, and 
therefore “preferences will some-
times prove necessary to achieve the 
Act’s basic equal opportunity goal.” 
Bolstering this interpretation is the 
fact that neither Congress nor the 
lower courts have suggested that 
neutral work policies—such as neu-
tral furniture budget rules—justify 
automatically exempting employ-
ers from ADA requirements. The 
Court then launched an equally dis-
approving attack on Barnett’s inter-
pretation of  “reasonable accommo-
dation” as “effective accommoda-
tion.” It is not enough, the Court 
wrote, for an employee to prove 
that her proposed accommodation 
will effectively meet her disability-
related needs. The employee must 
also demonstrate that the proposed 
accommodation “seems reason-
able on its face,” meaning that the 
accommodation would be reason-
able “in the run of  cases.”
Having concluded that the ADA 
may mandate preferential treat-
ment but requires proof  of  reason-
ableness, the Court then applied 
its analysis to the particularities of  
Barnett’s seniority system challenge. 
Concurring with other courts, the 
majority recognized the benefi-
cial effects of  seniority systems on 
employee-management relations: 
most notably, they cabin manage-
ment discretion, thereby inducing 
employee expectations of  fair, stan-
dardized treatment. It follows that 
employers and nondisabled employ-
ees would suffer greatly if  courts 
granted disabled employees auto-
matic superseniority rights for reas-
signment purposes under the ADA. 
Therefore, the Court held, it would 
not “ordinarily” be reasonable for 
an ADA job reassignment to trump 
seniority rules, and an employer’s 
showing that an assignment would 
violate the rules of  a seniority sys-
tem would warrant summary judg-
ment for the employer “in the run 
of  cases.”
But in keeping with its compro-
mise analysis, the Court also held 
that an employee could avoid sum-
mary judgment by demonstrating 
that “special circumstances” exist. 
Such special circumstances might 
include evidence that the seniority 
system already contains so many 
exceptions, or is altered unilater-
ally by the employer so frequently, 
that allowing an exception for dis-
abled employees would not signifi-
cantly alter employee expectations. 
Because Barnett had not yet had the 
opportunity to make such a show-
ing, the Court remanded the case 
for further proceedings.72
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The close 5-4 decision drew a concurrence 
and two dissents.73 Justice Souter’s dissent sided with 
Barnett, and argued in favor of  the Ninth Circuit’s 
case-by-case, fact-intensive approach, under which 
a seniority system would be merely one factor in 
a court’s analysis of  undue hardship limitation.74 
His dissent notes nothing in the ADA insulates 
seniority rules from the reasonable accommodation 
requirement which is in marked contrast to the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of  1967 (ADEA) 
and Title VII.75 Admitting that statutory silence is 
ambiguous, Justice Souter cited legislative history 
that used the “factor” formula as evidence to support 
his position that seniority rules do not automatically 
trump reassignment rights.76
However, the ADA is distinct from other 
civil rights statutes due to its emphasis on “reasonable 
accommodation.”77
Because Barnett was the Court’s 
first stab at interpreting this core 
term, one might have expected 
the opinion to address the special 
implications of  the phrase and the 
additional responsibilities and costs 
employers must assume to respond 
adequately to the distinct problem 
of  disability discrimination. Instead, 
the Court treated the ADA as more 
of  the same—as if  in drafting the 
ADA, Congress merely intended to 
add disability to the long list of  clas-
sifications already protected by Title 
VII and the ADEA, and to restate 
the Rehabilitation Act with only 
slight modification. Accordingly, 
the Court simply imported case law 
from other areas of  civil rights law 
and cited it as persuasive authority 
without fully justifying its applica-
tion to an ADA claim. . . .
To be sure, reasoning by analogy 
often drives our legal system for-
ward and is frequently an indispens-
able tool for statutory interpretation 
of  recently passed legislation. But a 
critical component of  reasoning by 
analogy is an explanation of  why it 
is appropriate to treat the issue at 
bar in accordance with the already-
decided issue. That the Barnett 
majority neglected to include this 
component leaves it open to the 
charge that it imply overlooked—
instead of  considering and reject-
ing— differences between the ADA 
and other antidiscrimination stat-
utes.
The analogies to other civil rights 
statutes are especially strained in 
light of  the evidence that Con-
gress intended the ADA to perform 
somewhat differently. As Justice 
Souter noted in his Barnett dissent, 
Title VII and the ADEA explicitly 
insulate seniority rules from the 
reasonable accommodation require-
ment; in marked contrast, the ADA 
does not. While the ADA’s silence 
certainly does not, on its own, 
mandate less deference to seniority 
systems under the ADA, legislative 
history suggests the possibility. The 
House and Senate Reports for the 
ADA explicitly limit an employer’s 
ability to use collective bargain-
ing agreements to avoid compli-
ance with the ADA. Moreover, the 
Senate Report explains that courts 
should consider a collective bargain-
ing agreement that reserves certain 
jobs for senior employees as only 
“a factor” in the decision whether 
to require the requested accom-
modation, and the House Report 
clarifies that “the agreement would 
not be determinative on the issue.” 
Barnett’s presumption that seniority 
rights trump the ADA’s reasonable 
accommodation provision seems to 
ignore these statements.78
“The Barnett Court’s holding is a relatively 
narrow one: an employer generally need not 
reassign a disabled employee as a reasonable 
accommodation if  doing so would conflict with the 
terms of  an employer’s seniority policy, unless special 
circumstances justify a different result.”79 As such, it 
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does not provide any clear black-letter law on which 
to analyze the facts of  Colwell v. Rite Aid. As Professor 
Befort concludes
The fundamental shortcoming of  
the Barnett decision . . . is in the 
Court’s failure to provide adequate 
guidance for future controver-
sies. The Court is imprecise with 
respect to the type of  “special cir-
cumstances” that will overcome the 
presumption of  unreasonableness 
in requiring a reassignment in the 
face of  a conflicting seniority sys-
tem. The Court does not explain 
how its ruling will impact the bal-
ance of  reassignment and other 
types of  transfer and assignment 
policies. The Court fails to articulate 
a clear allocation of  the burden of  
proof  responsibilities with respect 
to establishing a reasonable accom-
modation. And, finally, the Court 
falls short of  demarcating when, if  
ever, an accommodation should be 
deemed unreasonable by virtue of  
the fact that it requires the provision 
of  preferential treatment for the dis-
abled.
. . . .
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opin-
ion in Barnett provides an appropri-
ate touchstone for the unanswered 
questions relating to the reassign-
ment accommodation. According to 
[her], reassignment is unreasonable 
if  someone other than the disabled 
employee seeking a transfer has a 
legally enforceable entitlement to 
the position in question. This stan-
dard provides a predictable basis 
for determining Barnett’s special 
circumstances exception to the pre-
sumption favoring seniority systems. 
More broadly, this standard calls for 
an undue hardship-based test for 
determining whether reassignment 
should prevail over other types of  
transfer and assignment policies.80
D.  The Facts of  Colwell v. Rite Aid
Jeanette Colwell worked as a part-time 
cashier at a Rite-Aid pharmacy81. She would primarily 
work weekday shifts from 5 p.m. to 9 p.m.82 Her 
personal preferences were listed as 9 a.m. to 2 p.m. or 
5 p.m. to 9 p.m.83 During her employment, she was 
recognized by her superiors for good performance.84 
She subsequently developed a vision impairment 
that caused her to lose sight in her left eye; but this 
did not affect her ability to fully perform all of  the 
essential functions of  her job.85 Colwell informed her 
supervisor that her impairment made it dangerous 
and difficult for her to drive at night and requested 
that she be assigned only to the day shifts.86 Her 
supervisor denied her request, stating that allowing 
her to work only day shifts “wouldn’t be fair” to other 
employees.87 In the meantime, Colwell had family 
members drive her to and from work. Although 
she did not miss any work, Colwell claimed this 
arrangement posed a hardship to her family, and 
renewed her request for a day shift only schedule.88 
Rite-Aid continued to schedule her for a mixture of  
day and night shifts.89 After unsuccessfully engaging 
her union representative in the dialogue, Colwell 
ultimately submitted her resignation complaining of  
unfair treatment.90
The District Court granted summary 
judgment for Rite Aid on the ADA claim, concluding 
that while Colwell was an individual with a disability, 
she did not suffer any adverse employment action 
cognizable under the ADA.91 Specifically, the 
District Court found that because Colwell did not 
need any reasonable accommodation in order to 
perform the essential functions of  her job, Rite 
Aid had no obligation to consider her shift transfer 
request and “had no duty to accommodate her 
commute to work.”92 It viewed such a request as 
“tantamount to making an employer responsible for 
how an employee gets to work, a situation which 
expands the employer’s responsibility beyond the 
ADA’s intention.”93 On Colwell’s appeal, the Third 
Circuit reversed. It held that “as a matter of  law that 
changing her working schedule to day shifts in order 
to alleviate her disability-related difficulties in getting 
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The year before Colwell, a different three 
judge panel in the Third Circuit ruled in the 
unpublished commuting related ADA case of  Parker 
v. Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc.95 In this case, Verizon had 
conformed to a number of  components of  Parker’s 
accommodation request, but denied a transfer to a 
location that would have shorted his commute as 
suggested by his physician.96 The Third Circuit stated 
that “Verizon’s failure to accommodate Parker by 
limiting his commute was not required.”97 With no 
Third Circuit precedent on point, the Court cited 
two cases from other circuits it found persuasive.98 
The first was Kvorjak v. Maine, holding that “the 
[employer’s] decision to reject an accommodation 
based on [the employee’s] commute does not 
demonstrate a disregard for its obligations under the 
ADA.”99 The facts and holding are distinguishable 
from both Parker and Colwell in that the basis for the 
courts decision was actually predicated on Kvorjak’s 
inability to perform the essential functions of  his job 
at home, not that the accommodation requested was 
unreasonable because it rose to the level of  undue 
hardship.100 The second case was LaResca v. American 
Telephone & Telegraph, holding that “commuting to and 
from work is not part of  the work environment that an 
employer is required to reasonably accommodate.”101 
LaResca suffered from bouts of  epilepsy and 
therefore could not drive himself  to work. Although 
he could nonetheless perform all essential functions 
of  the job, he was denied this accommodation under 
the New Jersey State Law Against Discrimination, 
not the ADA.102
Another example from a different circuit 
decision where the commute to work was excluded 
from the potential reasonable accommodations was 
in Florida. There, a school guidance counselor was 
denied a transfer to a closer school to reduce her 
commute in the case of  Salmon v. Dade County School 
Board.103 The Court reasoned that “the commute to 
and from work is an activity that is unrelated to and 
outside of  her job. While an employer is required to 
provide reasonable accommodations that eliminate 
barriers in the work environment, an employer is not 
required to eliminate those barriers which exist outside 
the work environment.”104
Before Colwell, the only recorded case 
going against precedent was the Second Circuit 
case Lyons v. Legal Aid Society, which held that 
employers must consider an accommodation related 
to the commute.105 Lyons was an attorney who was 
injured in a near fatal automobile accident, and 
her resulting condition severely limited her ability 
to walk long distances.106 Because her condition 
precludes her from taking public transportation, 
she asked her employer to pay for parking near her 
office and the courts in which she would practice.107 
The court reversed the summary judgment for the 
employer, holding that there is nothing “inherently 
unreasonable . . . in requiring an employer to furnish 
an otherwise qualified employee with assistance in 
getting to work,” and remanded the case back to the 
trial court to establish a factual record as to whether 
this requested accommodation rose to the level of  
undue hardship for the employer.108
The Third Circuit in Colwell found the 
infrequently cited fifteen year old Second Circuit 
Lyons reasoning to be persuasive, stating
At least one other court of  appeals 
has recognized this principle. In 
Lyons v. Legal Aid Society an employee 
who suffered severe physical impair-
ments due to a car accident that pre-
vented her from walking long dis-
tances sued her employer, Legal Aid, 
under the ADA in part for refusing 
to provide her financial assistance 
to pay for a parking space close to 
work. The Second Circuit held that 
the employee stated an ADA claim 
because, depending on the circum-
stances, such an accommodation 
might be reasonable. Although we 
voice no comment on that court’s 
holding that a reasonable accom-
modation could include funds to 
pay for an employee’s parking space, 
we agree with the court’s observa-
tion that “there is nothing inher-
ently unreasonable, given the stated 
views of  Congress and the agencies 
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responsible for overseeing the fed-
eral disability statutes, in requiring 
an employer to furnish an otherwise 
qualified disabled employee with 
assistance related to her ability to 
get to work.”109
F.		 The	Ninth	Circuit	follows	Colwell
In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit 
recently followed Colwell in Livingston v. Fred Meyers 
Stores, Inc.110 Similar to Jeanette Colwell, Michelle 
Livingston suffers from a vision impairment that 
affects her ability to safely drive and walk outside 
after dark.111
In the fall of  2005, Livingston’s 
supervisor granted Livingston’s 
request to work a modified schedule 
during the fall and winter months 
so that she could minimize driv-
ing after dark. In the fall of  2006, 
however, Fred Meyer Stores denied 
Livingston’s request for a modified 
schedule, even though the store had 
not experienced any hardship the 
previous year when Livingston was 
permitted to work under a modified 
schedule. In fact, Livingston was 
credited with increasing wine sales 
and improving the store’s ranking 
when she worked under the modi-
fied schedule.” When Livingston 
refused to work her scheduled shift, 
Fred Meyer fired her.112
The Court reversed the district court order 
granting summary judgment in favor of  the employer 
and held that that Livingston had “raised a triable 
issue of  material fact that Fred Meyer Stores failed to 
reasonably accommodate her and failed to engage in 
the interactive process in good faith.”113
IV.		Other	Circuits	Should	Adopt	the	
Holding	and	Reasoning	of	Colwell
A. The Legislative History of  the ADA Compels 
Adoption
Colwell utilizes legislative history to reach the 
conclusion that an accommodation for a disability 
can extend to the workplace commute. It notes
Congress acknowledged that “mod-
ified work schedules can provide 
useful accommodations” and noted 
that “persons who may require 
modified work schedules are per-
sons with mobility impairments 
who depend on a public transpor-
tation system that is not currently 
fully accessible.” …Thus, the ADA 
does not strictly limit the breadth 
of  reasonable accommodations to 
address only those problems that 
an employee has in performing her 
work that arise once she arrives at 
the workplace.114
When introducing the ADA, cosponsor 
Senator D’Amato specifically noted the daily struggles 
that people with disabilities face in getting to and from 
work.115 “The barriers the disabled must overcome 
in order to meet basic needs are many. Activities 
accomplished with ease by most— communicating, 
commuting, or entering the workplace—are often 
significant hurdles for those with disabilities. This 
legisiation (sic), Mr. President, will break down these 
barriers once and for all.”116 Congress also considered 
that improvements to public transportation would 
help people with disabilities commute to work.117 
Also, it knew that handicapped parking spaces118 
and architectural improvements to the workplace 
such as ramps119 would make it possible for people 
with disabilities to get into the workplace. Clearly, by 
enacting the ADA, Congress was concerned not only 
with accommodating workers once they somehow 
miraculously arrived inside the workplace, but they 
were also cognizant they needed to help people with 
disabilities to arrive at exterior of  and to enter the 
workplace. Commuting to work is an important 
prerequisite to reducing the unemployment rate for 
people with disabilities, one of  the key aims for the 
ADA.120
B. Adopting Colwell is Consistent with Current 
Workplace Employment Trends and is Sound 
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Public Policy
It is well established that “[i]ssues related to 
getting to work keep many potential employees with 
disabilities from working to their fullest potential,”121 
and that the ADA was intended to be construed 
broadly.122 Since the employment objectives of  the 
ADA were never achieved,123 construing the statute 
to cover situations such as those that arose in Colwell 
can help eliminate a key barrier to accomplishing 
those goals.
Outside of  the realm of  ADA 
accommodations, employers have been 
accommodating the needs of  their employees with 
more workplace flexibility. For example, a recent 
study found that
[t]here are two changes in the provi-
sion of  flexibility between 2008 and 
1998: 79 percent of  employers now 
allow at least some employees to 
periodically change their arrival and 
departure time, up from 68 percent. 
In addition, 47 percent of  employ-
ers allow at least some employees 
to move from full-time to part-time 
work and back again while remain-
ing in the same position or level, 
down from 57 percent.124
Considering work hour flexibility as 
a reasonable accommodation for people with 
disabilities would not be an unusual accommodation 
since it is offered to a large proportion of  employees 
including those without disabilities. Public policy 
would be served by a broad adoption of  Colwell.
C.  Employers Retain the Undue Hardship Defense
Holding that as a matter of  law that 
issues related to the workplace commute must be 
considered within the realm of  possible reasonable 
accommodations does not mean that the employer 
must automatically accommodate requests such as 
those made by Jeanette Colwell; employers still retain 
the undue hardship defense.125 “An accommodation is 
not reasonable if  it would impose an ‘undue hardship’ 
on the employer’s business.”126 As described in Section 
II.B supra, this term ‘undue hardship” is defined in 
the statute. “The cost for an employer must be more 
than de minimus before the undue hardship test will 
be satisfied. . . . Each case must be decided on an 
individual basis.”127
In addition to cost, employer concerns in 
providing accommodations also include a threat to 
employee morale if  some workers are provided with 
more flexibility in some workplace rules.
With respect to the impact on other 
employees, the undue hardship test 
will not be satisfied if  the disruption 
to them results from fears or preju-
dices towards the individual’s dis-
ability and not from the provision 
of  the accommodation. Nor is there 
an undue hardship if  the accom-
modation negatively impacts on the 
morale of  the other employees but 
does not affect those employees’ 
ability to perform their jobs.128
The courts have already addressed the issue 
of  when changes to work schedules such as changing 
shifts for non-commute related commutes rise to 
the level of  undue hardship,129 so determining when 
this category of  request reaches the level of  undue 
hardship could be easily integrated with existing 
law and employer practices. Also, this reasonable 
accommodation-undue hardship determination 
requires close attention to the specific facts related to 
workplace characteristics for both the employer and 
the employee.130 For example, more will be expected 
of  larger employers, and less of  smaller employers.131 
Because of  the fact specific nature of  the inquiry, 
juries should be the ones making the determination 
of  what constitutes undue hardship instead of  judges 
making a determination about reasonableness as a 
matter of  law.132
D.  Engaging in the Interactive Process on Work 
Schedules Makes Good Business Sense
Employers have been providing flexible work 
schedules to their entire employee population on an 
increasingly frequent basis.133 The benefits of  these 
flexible work schedules benefit both the employee 
and the employer. One example is the Results-Only 
Work Environment (ROWE) program implemented 
at electronics retailer Best Buy. “The premise of
ROWE is that employees can do ‘whatever 
they want whenever they want as long as the work 
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gets done.’”134 Although the program was in response 
to employee feedback, it also provided benefits to the 
employer.135 “ROWE teams at Best Buy report an 
average 3.2 percent lower voluntary turnover rates 
than non-ROWE teams and employees report that 
ROWE has changed their personal and work lives 
for the better. ROWE teams are also experiencing an 
average 35% increase in productivity.”136 Other studies 
have also demonstrated the link between workplace 
flexibility, increased employee engagement, and 
reduced turnover.137 Another example is that research 
suggests that providing employees more flexibility 
over their working patterns is likely to improve their 
health.138 The improved outcomes were in the areas 
of  “systolic blood pressure and heart rate, tiredness, 
mental health, sleep duration, sleep quality and 
alertness and self-rated health status,”139 and was 
“also noted in well-being, such as co-workers’ social 
support and sense of  community.”140
Since technology and workplace expectations 
change, employers should not rely on either past 
precedent or how they decided internally in a similar 
situation in the past. They should engage in the 
interactive process with each request for flexibility. 
Under the ADA, it is “clear that the [undue-hardship] 
burden should be viewed as dynamic, one that 
will change over time depending on what courts 
and juries consider appropriate as technology and 
social expectations change. If  the social context 
of  the statute has any significance at all, it is that 
accommodations that seemed beyond the pale 
yesterday will be considered ordinary tomorrow.”141
V.	Conclusion
In the introduction, this author admits 
to using hyperbole in choosing to say that Colwell 
“breaks new ground.” Although it is a break from the 
case law, the subsequent golf  analogy of  “replacing a 
divot” is also introduced to characterize the change 
as a shift back to the original meaning and intent of  
the ADA as passed by Congress and signed into law 
by President Bush. Colwell and Livingston are simply 
returns to an interpretation of  the statute in harmony 
with Congress’s broad goal under Title I of  the ADA 
in helping enable people with disabilities participate 
in the job market.
Judge Harold Leventhal is credited with saying 
that citing legislative history is akin to “looking over 
a crowd and picking out your friends.”142 However, 
accommodating needs related to the workplace 
commute are not circumstances in which there are 
conflicting messages in the legislative history. There 
is no evidence that Congress intended to preclude 
the commute to the workplace from consideration 
as a possible reasonable accommodation; legislative 
history and the text of  the statute both provide 
evidence to the contrary. Judge Slovitier was right 
when he wrote in Colwell that “changing Colwell’s 
working hour schedule . . . is a type of  accommodation 
the ADA contemplates. The statute expressly says 
so.”143
The ADAAA of  2008 reduced the threshold 
for coverage under the act back to Congress’s original 
intent two decades earlier.144 With increased coverage, 
I anticipate that there will be more opportunity for 
employers, and ultimately the courts to decide whether 
flexibility related to the workplace commute can be 
accommodated without creating undue hardship on 
the employer.145 Employers should engage in the 
interactive process with employees or applicants with 
disabilities that have difficulty with commuting for 
two reasons. It not only makes good business sense, 
but is also what Congress commands.
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